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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
credibility is barred by MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CRIMINAL No. 2.01(2).35 However, the parties are allowed to argue the
witness' credibility to the jury.
The methods adopted in Brown and Carlos for dealing with witnesses
who refuse testimony should offer guidance to courts and trial lawyers
in an area which has been litigated rarely, but is nonetheless critical to
defendants in criminal prosecutions. Partial striking and the jury in-
struction offer reasonable alternatives for trial judges previously faced
with a choice between the somewhat drastic sanction of total striking or




PLEAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
PROPER INFERENCES
FROM THE EVIDENCE.
State v. Bryant I
Robert Kenneth Bryant and two accomplices robbed the First Bank
of Commerce of Columbia, Missouri. As the robbers left the scene,
police arrived and gave chase. The fleeing robbers discharged a shotgun
at a pursuing police car and wounded a bystander. Bryant was captured
and charged with first degree robbery and assault with intent to kill with
malice aforethought. 2 At trial, the prosecutor made the following
statements in his dosing argument to the jury, without objection by the
public defender:
35. Id. at 347. Judge Donnelly, concurring in Brown, suggested that the trial
judge could immediately advise the jury that they could weigh the witness' re-
fusal to answer in assessing the credibility of the witness' testimony. Id. It is ar-
guable that such a comment would violate Mo. APPROVED INSTR.-CRIM. No.
2.01(2) (1976 ed.): "[Y]ou alone must decide upon the believability of the wit-
nesses and the weight and value of the evidence." The Notes on Use of this
instruction caution: "Except as may be specifically provided for elsewhere in
MAI-CR, no other or additional instruction may be given on the believability of
witnesses, or the effect, weight or value of their testimony."
1. 548 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
2. Id. at 210.
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[1] They were shooting all over the place, and there were bullets and
shells. I don't think that was meant to scare anybody. I think it
was meant to kill Harold Calvin [the pursuing officer], for
example.
[2] ... [Y]ou can find this man guilty of first degree robbery
with a dangerous and deadly weapon. You can find him not
guilty.... If you find him not guilty I will give him the shotgun
and send him back on the street. That is what "not guilty"
means-right out the door today, a free man on Count I.
[3] To set a man free on Count II would say to a policeman:
"Tough, too bad, Harold. You are being shot at but too bad."
Say to a lot of policemen who go out there and get shot at when these
crimes occur, and they are occurring more every day. Tough. You
have a chance to say something about it.3
Bryant was convicted on both counts. On appeal, he sought a new
trial based on an allegation of plain error because the prosecutor's clos-
ing argument was "calculated to influence and arouse the personal pas-
sions, prejudices, and fears of the jury." 4 The Kansas City District of
the Missouri Court of Appeals found no plain error and affirmed the
conviction.5 It held that the contested statements were either proper
pleas for law enforcement or proper inferences from the evidence.'
Prosecutorial closing argument in a Missouri criminal trial has two
primary purposes. The main purpose is to -provide the jury with a ra-
tional summation and analysis of the evidence and its implications re-
garding the defendant's guilt.7 The second purpose is to aid the jury in
setting an appropriate sentence if it finds the defendant guilty." Thus,
a properly presented closing argument aids the jury to make a determi-
nation of the defendant's guilt or innocence based solely on the evidence
and its, implications. An improperly presented closing argument is one
that stimulates the jury to find the defendant guilty for reasons other
than those drawn from the evidence, e.g., personal fear of crime in gen-
eral or personal fear of the defendant. Consequently, any statement not
contributing to the jury's rational conclusions about a criminal defen-
dant's guilt should be scrutinized closely because such a statement may
operate to deny the defendant a fair trial.
In State v. Bryant statement number three in the prosecutor's closing
argument was upheld as a proper plea for law enforcement.9 In Mis-
souri the propriety of a plea for law enforcement is a well defined rule.
3. Id. at 211.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 212.
6. Id.
7. Crump, The Function and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw. L.J.
505, 506 (1974).
8. State v. Blumer, 546 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
9. 548 S.W.2d at 212.
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The courts have long recognized the right of a prosecutor to urge the
jury to enforce the law.10 It is proper to point out the prevalence of
crime or its purported increase. References to "the crime wave from
which this city and other cities have suffered," 1 and "the rising crime
rate,"12 have been permitted. It is also proper to argue for a stiff sen-
tence to deter others from the commission of similar crimes. In State v.
Green the prosecutor was permitted to request a five year sentence "so
that the word 'will go out along the grapevine to the underworld that
Springfield, Missouri, is not the place to come . . . ,, 13 It is also proper
for a prosecutor to elaborate on the consequences of a jury failing to do
its duty. Thus, in urging the conviction of a defendant for striking a
police officer, the prosecutor was permitted to predict "[A]n acquittal
today will justify resisting arrest for any charge, allow striking of an of-
ficer, and may set a course of conduct that might open up the floodgates
for an activity-for a summer of activity along this line ... ," 14
On the other hand, it is clearly improper for a prosecutor in Mis-
souri to argue that the defendant should be imprisoned to prevent him
from committing future crimes. In State v. Mobley, after referring to the
defendant as an "habitual criminal, a professional burglar, and a
dangerous criminal," the prosecutor improperly stated to the jury:
"[Y]ou and only you, by your verdict, can deter him." 15 Similarly, the
statement "I hope you don't put him back on the streets. I hope you give
him sixty, or seventy, or eighty or ninety years, so he can't do this again"
was held improper. 16 The courts prohibit these arguments because they
can result in guilty verdicts based on the jury's speculation about future
crimes rather than on the evidence presented concerning the crime for
which the defendant is being tried. It is also improper to argue that the
jury or members of their families are in danger. Thus, the argument,
"[d]on't let him out running around the streets 'cause if any of you have
any daughters and if this defendant ever got the opportunity your
daughter could be the next one," was held improper in a case involving
the attempted rape of a six year old girl.17 The concern with this type
of argument is that the jury will convict the defendant out of personal
fear as opposed to his actual guilt as shown by the evidence and its im-
plications.
As currently used, therefore, the plea for law enforcement is per-
mitted so long as the language remains abstract. General comments
10. State -v. Mallon, 75 Mo. 355, 358 (1882).
11. State v. Wilson, 242 S.W. 886, 888 (Mo. 1922).
12. State v. Elbert, 438 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. 1969).
13. 292 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Mo. 1956).
14. State v. Rodriguez, 484 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. 1972).
15. 369 S.W.2d 576, 581 (Mo. 1963).
16. State v. Raspberry, 452 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Mo. 1970).
17. State v. Groves, 295 S.W.2d 169, 173-74 (Mo. 1956).
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about the community's crime wave or the necessity of deterring criminals
from future activity are permitted regardless of an emotional delivery of
the prosecutor's argument or the emotional impact of the argument on
the jury. The argument is improper, however, if it specifically focuses on
the defendant, on the jury, or on the jurors' families.
The justification for permitting pleas for law enforcement in Mis-
souri has varied. Originally such argument was admitted as a mere
statement of the truth. In State v. Hyland the statement that "crimes of
this character are becoming too frequent" was held unobjectionable be-
cause it was merely a "truism." 18 Pleas for law enforcement also have
been admitted under the "common knowledge" exception to comments
made outside the record. Thus, in response to the statement "you jurors
may send out a warning or encouragement, whichever you may see fit,"
the Missouri Supreme Court held that "it is not improper for the pros-
ecutor to refer to the prevalence of crime in the community, whether it
appears from the evidence or is a matter of common know-
ledge .... ,19 There is also a confusing line of cases that appears to
admit pleas of law enforcement because they are somehow within the
record or its reasonable inferences. 20 The most common justification
for admitting pleas for law enforcement is an adherence to stare de-
cisis.2 ' Finally, there is the position that pleas for law enforcement are
admissible only for the secondary purpose of aiding the jury in setting
an appropriate sentence. 22
All of the justifications utilized to allow pleas for law enforcement
beg the main question. As currently permitted, pleas for law enforce-
ment are often more detrimental than beneficial in furthering the pur-
poses of closing argument. The issue is whether such argument contri-
butes to the jury's conclusions of guilt for reasons other than the properly
admitted evidence and its implications. The answer in many cases is
clearly affirmative. 23 The emotion and subject matter involved in pleas
18. 144 Mo. 302, 313, 46 S.W. 195, 198 (1898).
19. State v. Hart, 292 Mo. 74, 99, 237 S.W. 473, 481 (1922).
20. State v. Laster, 365 Mo. 1076, 1085, 293 S.W.2d 300, 306 (En Banc), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 936 (1956). Contra, State v. Cheatham, 340 S.W.2d 16, 20 (Mo.
1960) (the defense claimed the plea for law enforcement was inadmissible be-
cause it was outside the record; the Missouri Supreme Court held that such a
plea does not need to be within the record).
21. State v. Lang, 515 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo. 1974); State v. Wright, 515
S.W.2d 421, 432 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
22. State v. Blumer, 546 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
23. In a very few cases, the possibility exists that jurors wil not find the
defendant guilty even though they feel the evidence proves his guilt. If the
jurors have obvious sympathy for the defendant, or believe the activity involved
should not be criminal, then a controlled plea for law enforcement would be
permissible. Thus, a prosecutor confronted with this situation should be allowed
to set out the specific elements of the crime and instruct the jurors that if they
find these elements to exist, they must do their duty and find the defendant
4
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for law enforcement suppress rationality, confuse the issue, stimulate la-
tent fears and prejudices, and overcome reasonable doubts about a par-
ticular defendant's guilt.24 The courts have reduced this problem
somewhat by allowing only pleas of an abstract nature. As a practical
matter, however, jurors are sophisticated enough to apply an abstract
plea to the specific crime or defendant before them.
In the final analysis, the only substantial justification for admitting
law enforcement pleas is for the secondary purpose of sentencing. If the
defendant is not to be sentenced by the jury, pleas for law enforcement
are not justified. In cases where the jury wilr be sentencing the defen-
dant, the possible prejudicial impact of the subject matter should be
weighed against its benefits. The courts should reject the abstract-specific
distinction and ask whether this type of crime requires prosecutorial
urging before a jury will be likely to set an appropriate sentence.2 5 If
the answer is no, it is submitted that the prosecutor should be prohibited
from making a plea for law enforcement. If this analysis had been
applied in Bryant, an opposite result would have been reached. In Bryant
there was little chance the jury would not set a severe sentence if the
defendant were found guilty. The armed robbery of a bank and
wounding of an innocent bystander is the type of crime which generally
emotionalizes a jury. Few juries would be sympathetic toward an armed
bank robber. Therefore, although the plea for law enforcement in Bryant
was proper under the current rule, it should not have been permitted.
The first and second statements by the prosecutor in Bryant were
upheld as proper inferences from the evidence.26 There are two prob-
lems surrounding the proper inference rule in Missouri. One is that Mis-
souri has recognized three inconsistent rules for admitting inferential
argument. There are a few decisions which have followed the "anything
goes" rule and have held that no error is committed by a prosecutor
"drawing an unwarranted inference. '27 There is an independent line of
cases that have held that "a prosecutor has the right to draw any infer-
guilty, despite either their sympathy for the defendant or personal beliefs that
the activity involved should not be criminal.
24. See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct By Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx.
L. REv. 629, 636 (1972).
25. This type of offense almost always would be minor in nature, e.g., the 57
m.p.h. highway speeder. One major crime where a plea for law enforcement
might be appropriate is the rape of a woman who is shown to have engaged in
previous sexual activity. Missouri's new shield law, H. 502, 79th Gen. Assem., 1st
Reg. Sess., (1977) (effective Sept. 28, 1977), 1977 Mo. Legis. Serv. 306 (Vernon),
which prohibits evidence in a rape case of the victim's previous sexual conduct,
apparently will avoid the problem of the overly lenient jury.
26. 548 S.W.2d at 212.
27., State v. Wright, 319 Mo. 46, 52, 4 S.W.2d 456, 458 (1928). Accord, State
v. Rosengrant, 338 Mo. 1153, 1175, 93 S.W.2d 961, 973-74 (1936); State v. Hart,
292 Mo. 74, 97, 237 S.W. 473, 480 (1922).
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ence from the evidence which he in good faith believes to be justified."2 8
There is also the position that "as long as the prosecutor stays within the
confines of the evidence and its reasonable inferences therefrom, the
argument is legitimate." 29 It is true that the majority of recent cases
appear to have followed the reasonable inference rule, but neither the
good faith rule nor the anything goes rule has been overruled. A deci-
sion expressly overruling the good faith and anything goes rules would
help clarify the situation.
The second problem with the rule allowing argument of proper
inferences from the evidence arises when the reasonable inference ap-
proach is followed. The courts are continuously handing down inconsis-
tent opinions regarding the reasonableness of similar statements. Three
cases provide an example. In State v. Williams the defendant was charged
with assault with intent to kill with malice aforethought because he shot
a man with a sawed-off shotgun.3 0 In closing argument, the prosecutor
stated to the jury that "you've got a great responsibility. You put this
man on the street again and he'll have another shotgun ."31 The trial
court sustained an objection to this statement and instructed the jury to
disregard it. The court of appeals held that the sustained objection and
the instruction to disregard the statement were sufficient to remove
the prejudicial effect of the error. In State v. Henderson the defendant
was on trial for second degree murder and assault with intent to kill
without malice aforethought.32 The defendant had killed a man during
a holdup with a revolver that was found in his room after the inci-
dent.3 3 Without objection by the defendant's attorney, the prosecutor
argued that "if you want to put this defendant back on the street, I will
give him his .38 and he can go back... ." ,34 Although the court of ap-
peals did not rule on the propriety of the remark due to the inadequate
objection, it did hold that the remark was not so serious as to constitute
plain error. In State v. Bryant the defendant was convicted of armed rob-
bery and assault with intent to kill with malice aforethought.3 5 The de-
fendant was captured hiding in some shrubs after fleeing from the scene
of the robbery. He was arrested by a police officer who approached him
from behind while the defendant was aiming his sawed-off shotgun at an
28. State v. Smith, 527 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975). Accord,
State v. Feger, 340 S.W.2d 716, 728 (Mo. 1960); State v. Francis,'330 Mo. 1205,
1212, 52 S.W.2d 552, 556 (1932).
29. State v. Nichelson, 546 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977). Ac-
cord, State v. Bolden, 525 S.W.2d 625, 634 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); State v.
Fox, 510 S.W.2d 832, 838 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
30. 525 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
31. Id. at 400.
32. 510 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
33. Id. at 817.
34. Id. at 823.
35. 548 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
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unsuspecting officer approaching from the opposite direction.3 6 The
prosecutor, without objection from the public defender, stated: "If you
find him not guilty I will give him the shotgun and send him back on
the street." 37 The court of appeals ignored the fact that the defendant
would never have the shotgun returned because the mere possession of
such a weapon is a federal offense.38 It held the remark to be "inoffen-
sive" and "an accurate and proper inference."39 - Thus, the same basic
statement has been inconsistently held to be objectionable, not plain
error, and an inoffensive, accurate, and proper inference.
There are four primary reasons for the inconsistency regarding
reasonable inferences from the evidence. The first is that there is an
obvious and uncorrectable difficulty in reaching a consensus on what is
"reasonable."
The second reason for inconsistency is that there is a tendency for
courts to avoid the substantive issue of reasonableness entirely by an un-
duly technical reliance on the rules of criminal procedure. Failure to
object immediately, specifically, and repeatedly to an improper argument
is often fatal because courts rarely exercise their discretion to grant a
motion for new trial or to reverse on appeal due to plain error when
improper prosecutorial closing argument is the basis for the motion or
appeal. 40  This reliance on procedural rules to avoid ruling on the
propriety of prosecutorial inferences not only postpones the establish-
ment of a well-defined rule, but such judicial inaction operates to confer
approval on improper arguments. 41 Procedural strictness resulting in
the admission of prejudicial statements can deny a defendant a fair trial.
Permitting a jury to consider prejudicial statements in determining guilt
has the potential to cause a conviction for a reason other than what was
shown in the evidence.
The third reason is that the strength of the evidence pointing to the
defendant's guilt often is used as a factor in determining whether an
inference is improper. In State v. Frazier, after upholding a questionable
inference, the court stated in dictum:
[E]ven assuming arguendo that the comment was improper, we
believe that the alleged error would be governed by the doc-
trine of harmless error.
36. Interview with Officer Carroll Highbarger, Columbia Police Dept., Co-
lumbia, Missouri (October 26, 1977).
37. 548 S.W.2d at 211.
38. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(a), 5861(b) (1970 & Supp. 1977).
39. 548 S.W.2d at 212.
40. See State v. Johnigan, 494 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo. 1973); State v. Anderson,
384 S.W.2d 591, 609-10 (Mo. En Banc 1964) (comparison of the defendant's
crime to the gas chambers in Germany was permitted due to lack of objection);
State v. Farmer, 536 S.W.2d 748, 751-52 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
41. See State v. Bryant, 548 S.W.2d at 211. The Court misread Henderson to
hold the "back on the street" statement a proper inference when, in fact, it was
held merely not to be plain error.
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... An error which in a close case might call for reversal
may be disregarded as harmless when the evidence of guilt is
strong.... The judgment should not be reversed when this
court is fully satisfied that the error did not contribute to the
result reached in the trial court.42
One criticism of this factor is that some questionable inferences are
labeled reasonable by the courts, not because they actually are reason-
able, but because they are considered harmless. This further confuses the
definition of reasonable inference. A second problem is the constitu-
tional propriety of weighing guilt. Permitting otherwise prejudicial error
because the court feels the defendant is guilty is tantamount to holding
that the innocent are entitled stricter procedural standards than the
guilty.43 The court also cannot determine with precision whether the
improper closing argument did, in fact, influence the jury's verdict.
Thus, the guilt factor should be excluded from decisions concerning the
reasonableness of inferences.
The fourth reason for inconsistency is that the courts often use the
reasonable inference rule to justify arguments that should not be per-
mitted because they violate other rules.4 4 The Bryant "back on the street
with his shotgun" statement is an example in point.45 Assuming the
statement was a reasonable inference from the evidence, it is still subject
to attack under three other rules. First, the statement contributed
absolutely nothing to the jury's rational conclusions of guilt and was,
therefore, irrelevant. Second, the statement had the obvious potential of
personalizing the jury. Because it is error to put the jury in personal fear
of the defendant, 46 the statement was improper. Third, the statement
carried the ominous warning that the defendant was going to commit
future crimes. Because suggestions of future criminal activity are im-
proper,47 the statement was improper. This abuse of the reasonable in-
ference rule not only confuses the proper use of reasonable inferences
but also restricts the operation of the other rules ignored by the courts.
Allegations of prejudicial prosecutorial closing argument are preva-
lent in Missouri s. 4  Although prosecutorial abuse is not as widespread as
convicted criminal defendants claim, it is a serious problem. Further-
42. 522 S.W.2d 46, 48-49 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
43. Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution
of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 946, 971 (1954).
44. See State v. Nichelson, 546 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
45. 548 S.W.2d at 211.
46. State v. Paxton, 453 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Mo. 1970); State v. Groves, 295
S.W.2d 169, 174 (Mo. 1956). But cf. State v. Childers, 268 S.W.2d 858, 860-61
(Mo. 1954) (in a child molesting case, statements concerning the jurors'
daughters were held to be reasonable inferences).
47. State v. Green, 534 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); State v.
Heinrich, 492 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo. App., D.K.C., 1973).
48. There were more than 110 Missouri appellate decisions involving this
allegation in 1975 and 1976.
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